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Abstract 15 
The effectiveness of many widely used conservation interventions is poorly understood due to a lack of 16 
high-quality impact evaluations. Randomised Control Trials (RCTs), in which experimental units are 17 
randomly allocated to treatment or control groups, offer an intuitive means of calculating the impact of 18 
an intervention through establishing a reliable counterfactual scenario. As many conservation 19 
interventions depend on changing people’s behaviour, conservation impact evaluation can learn a great 20 
deal from RCTs in fields such as development economics, where RCTs have become widely used but are 21 
controversial. We build on relevant literature from other fields to discuss how RCTs, despite their 22 
potential, are just one of a number of ways to evaluate impact, are not feasible in all circumstances, and 23 
factors such as spillover between units and behavioural effects must be considered in their design. We 24 
offer guidance and a set of criteria for deciding when RCTs may be an appropriate approach for evaluating 25 
conservation interventions, and factors to consider to ensure an RCT is of high quality. We illustrate this 26 
with examples from one of the very few concluded RCTs of a large-scale conservation intervention – that 27 
of an incentive-based conservation program in the Bolivian Andes. We argue that conservation should 28 
aim to avoid a re-run of the polarized debate surrounding the use of RCTs in other fields. RCTs will not be 29 
possible or appropriate in many circumstances, but if used carefully they can certainly be useful and could 30 
become a more widely used tool in the conservation impact evaluator’s toolkit. 31 
Keywords 32 
Counterfactual, Evidence, Effectiveness, Impact Evaluation, Randomization, Randomized Control Trials, 33 
RCTs.  34 
Introduction 35 
It is widely recognised that conservation decisions should be evidence-informed (Pullin et al., 2004; Segan 36 
et al., 2011). Despite this, decisions often remain only weakly informed by the evidence base (e.g. 37 
Sutherland & Wordley, 2017). While this is at least partly due to decision makers’ continuing lack of access 38 
to evidence  (Rafidimanantsoa et al., 2018), complacency surrounding ineffective interventions (Pressey 39 
et al., 2017; Sutherland & Wordley, 2017), and perceived irrelevance of research to decision-making (Rose 40 
et al., 2018; Rafidimanantsoa et al., 2018), there are also limitations in the available evidence on the likely 41 
impacts of conservation interventions (Ferraro & Pattanayak, 2006; McIntosh et al., 2018). This has 42 
resulted in a growing interest in conservation impact evaluation (Ferraro & Hanauer, 2014; Baylis et al., 43 
2016; Börner et al., 2016; Pressey et al., 2017), and to the creation of initiatives to facilitate access to and 44 
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systematise the existing evidence, such as the Collaboration for Environmental Evidence (Anon., 2019a) 45 
and Conservation Evidence (Anon., 2019b). 46 
Impact evaluation, described by the World Bank as assessment of changes in outcomes of interest 47 
attributable to specific interventions (Independent Evaluation Group 2012), requires a counterfactual: an 48 
understanding of what would have occurred without that intervention (Miteva et al., 2012; Ferraro & 49 
Hanauer, 2014; Baylis et al., 2016; Pressey et al., 2017). It is well recognized that simple before-and-after 50 
comparison of units exposed to the intervention is flawed, as factors other than the intervention may 51 
have caused change in the outcomes of interest (Ferraro & Hanauer, 2014; Baylis et al., 2016). Simply 52 
comparing groups exposed and not exposed to the intervention is also flawed as the groups may differ in 53 
other ways that affect the outcome.  54 
One solution is to replace post-project monitoring with more robust quasi-experiments, in which a variety 55 
of approaches may be used to construct a counterfactual scenario statistically (Glennerster & 56 
Takavarasha, 2013; Butsic et al., 2017). For example, matching involves comparing outcomes in units 57 
where an intervention is implemented with outcomes in similar units (identified statistically) which lack 58 
the intervention. This is increasingly used for conservation impact evaluations, such as determining the 59 
impact of national park establishment (Andam et al., 2008) or Community Forest Management 60 
(Rasolofoson et al., 2015) on deforestation. Quasi-experiments have a major role to play in conservation 61 
impact evaluation, and in some situations they will be the only robust option available to evaluators (Baylis 62 
et al., 2016; Butsic et al., 2017). However, because the intervention is not allocated at random, unknown 63 
differences between treatment and control groups may bias quasi-experiments’ results (Michalopoulos 64 
et al., 2004; Glennerster & Takavarasha, 2013). This problem historically led many in development 65 
economics to question their usefulness (Angrist & Pischke, 2010). Each kind of quasi-experiment has 66 
associated assumptions which, if not met, affect the validity of the evaluation result (Glennerster & 67 
Takavarasha, 2013). 68 
Randomised Control Trials (‘RCTs’; also Randomised Controlled Trials) offer an outwardly straightforward 69 
solution to the limitations of other approaches to impact evaluation. By randomly allocating from the 70 
population of interest those units which will receive a particular intervention (the ‘treatment group’), and 71 
those which will not (the ‘control group’), there should be no systematic differences between groups 72 
(White, 2013b). Evaluators can therefore assume that in the absence of the intervention, the outcomes 73 
of interest would have changed in the same way in the two groups, making the control group a valid 74 
counterfactual.  75 
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This relative simplicity of RCTs, especially when compared with the statistical black box of quasi-76 
experiments, may make them more persuasive than other impact evaluation methods to sceptical 77 
audiences (Banerjee et al., 2016; Deaton & Cartwright, 2018). They are also – in theory – substantially less 78 
dependent than quasi-experiments on any theoretical understanding of how the intervention might or 79 
might not work (Glennerster & Takavarasha, 2013). RCTs are central to the paradigm of evidence-based 80 
medicine, and since the 1940s tens of thousands of RCTs have been conducted with them often 81 
considered the ‘gold standard’ for testing treatments’ efficacy (Barton, 2000). They are also widely used 82 
in agriculture, education, social policy (Bloom, 2008), labour economics (List & Rasul, 2011), and, 83 
increasingly over the last two decades, in development economics (Ravallion, 2009; Banerjee et al., 2016; 84 
Leigh, 2018; Deaton & Cartwright, 2018). The governments of both the United Kingdom and the United 85 
States have strongly supported the use of RCTs in evaluating policy effectiveness (Haynes et al., 2012; 86 
Council of Economic Advisers, 2014). The United States Agency for International Development explicitly 87 
states that experimental impact evaluation provides the strongest evidence, and alternative methods 88 
should be used only when random assignment is not feasible (USAID, 2016).  89 
However there exist both philosophical (e.g. Cartwright, 2010) and practical (Deaton, 2010; Deaton & 90 
Cartwright, 2018) critiques of RCTs. The statistical basis of randomised analyses is also not as simple as it 91 
might initially appear; randomisation can only be guaranteed to lead to complete balance between 92 
treatment and control groups with extremely large samples (Bloom, 2008). (However baseline data 93 
collection and stratification can greatly reduce the probability of unbalanced groups and remaining 94 
differences can be resolved through inclusion of covariates in analyses [Glennerster & Takavarasha, 95 
2013]). Evaluators also often calculate both the mean effect on units in the treatment group as a whole 96 
(the ‘intention to treat’) and the effect of the actual intervention on a treated unit (the ‘treatment on the 97 
treated’). These approaches will often give quite different results as there is commonly imperfect uptake 98 
of an intervention (a drug may not be taken correctly by all individuals in a treatment group, for example). 99 
Regardless of the polarised debate that RCTs’ spread in development economics has caused (Ravallion, 100 
2009; Deaton & Cartwright, 2018), some development RCTs have acted as a catalyst for the widespread 101 
implementation of trialled interventions (Leigh, 2018). There are increasing calls for more use of RCTs in 102 
evaluating environmental interventions (Pattanayak, 2009; Miteva et al., 2012; Samii et al., 2014; Ferraro 103 
& Hanauer, 2014; Baylis et al., 2016; Curzon & Kontoleon, 2016; Börner et al., 2016, 2017). As many kinds 104 
of conservation program aim to deliver environmental improvements through changing human behaviour 105 
(e.g. agri-environment schemes, provision of alternative livelihoods, protected area establishment, 106 
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payments for ecosystem services, REDD+ programs, and certification programs; we term these socio-107 
ecological interventions), there are clear lessons to be learnt from RCTs in development economics, which 108 
aim to achieve development outcomes through changing behaviour. 109 
A few pioneering RCTs of such socio-ecological interventions have recently been concluded (although 110 
these may not be fully exhaustive), evaluating: an incentive-based conservation program in Bolivia known 111 
as Watershared, described in this article; a payment program for forest carbon in Uganda (Jayachandran 112 
et al., 2017); unconditional cash transfers in support of conservation in Sierra Leone (Kontoleon et al., 113 
2016); and a program aimed at reducing wild meat consumption in the Brazilian Amazon through social 114 
marketing and incentivising consumption of chicken (Chaves et al., 2018). We expect that RCT evaluation 115 
in conservation will become more widespread in the coming years. 116 
We draw on a range of literature to examine the potential of RCTs for impact evaluation in the context of 117 
conservation. We discuss the factors influencing the usefulness, feasibility, and quality of RCT evaluation 118 
of conservation and aim to provide insights and guidance for researchers and practitioners interested in 119 
conducting high-quality evaluations. The structure of the article is mirrored by a checklist (Figure 1) which 120 
can be used to assess the suitability of an RCT in a given context. We illustrate these points with the recent 121 
RCT evaluating the Watershared incentive-based conservation program in the Bolivian Andes. This 122 
program, implemented by the NGO Fundación Natura Bolivia (‘Natura’), aims to reduce deforestation, 123 
conserve biodiversity, and provide socio-economic and water quality benefits to local communities 124 
(Bottazzi et al., 2018; Pynegar et al., 2018; Wiik et al., 2019; Figure 2).  125 
Under what circumstances might an RCT evaluation be useful? 126 
RCTs quantitatively evaluate an intervention’s impact in a particular context  127 
RCTs are a quantitative approach allowing the magnitude of the effect of an intervention on outcomes of 128 
interest to be estimated. Qualitative approaches based on causal chains or theory of change might be 129 
more suitable where such quantitative estimates are not needed or where the intervention can only be 130 
implemented in very few units (e.g. White & Phillips, 2012) or when the focus is on understanding the 131 
pathways of change from intervention through to outcome (Cartwright, 2010). Some have argued that 132 
such mechanistic understanding is more valuable than estimates of effect sizes for practitioners and 133 
policymakers (Cartwright, 2010; Miteva, Pattanayak & Ferraro, 2012; Deaton & Cartwright, 2018). To put 134 
this another way, RCTs can indicate whether an intervention works and to what extent, but policy makers 135 
often also wish to know why it works, to allow prediction of project success in other contexts.   136 
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This issue of external validity – the extent to which knowledge obtained from an RCT can be generalized 137 
to other contexts – is a major focus of the controversy surrounding RCT use in development economics 138 
(e.g. Deaton, 2010; Cartwright, 2010). Advocates for RCTs accept such critiques as partially valid (e.g. 139 
White, 2013b) and acknowledge that RCTs should be considered as providing complementary and not 140 
contradictory knowledge to other approaches. Firstly, more qualitative studies can be conducted 141 
alongside an RCT to examine processes of change; indeed most evaluators who advocate RCTs clearly also 142 
recognise that combining quantitative and qualitative approaches is likely to be most informative (e.g. 143 
White, 2013a). Secondly, researchers can use covariates to explore which contextual features affect 144 
outcomes of interest, to look for those features upon future implementation of the intervention (although 145 
to avoid data dredging, ideally hypotheses and analysis plans should be pre-registered). Statistical 146 
methods can also be used to explore heterogeneous responses within treatment groups in an RCT 147 
(Glennerster & Takavarasha, 2013), and RCTs may also be designed to answer more complex contextual 148 
questions through trials with multiple treatment groups or other modifications to the basic setup (Bonell 149 
et al., 2012).  Thirdly, evaluators may conduct RCTs of the same kind of intervention in different socio-150 
ecological contexts (White, 2013b), which increases results’ generalisability. While this is challenging due 151 
to the spatial and temporal scale of RCTs evaluating socio-ecological interventions, researchers have 152 
recently undertaken a number of RCTs of incentive-based conservation programs (Kontoleon et al., 2016; 153 
Jayachandran et al., 2017; Pynegar et al., 2018). Finally, the question of whether learning obtained in one 154 
location or context can be applicable to another is an epistemological question common to much applied 155 
research and is not limited to RCTs (Glennerster & Takavarasha, 2013).  156 
In the RCT evaluating the Bolivian Watershared program, the external validity issue has been addressed 157 
as a key concern. Similar socio-ecological systems exist throughout Latin America and incentive-based 158 
forest conservation projects have been widely implemented (Asquith, 2016). Natura is currently 159 
undertaking two complementary RCTs of the intervention in other parts of Bolivia. Finally, researchers 160 
used a combination of both qualitative and quantitative methods at the end of the evaluation period to 161 
understand in more depth participant motivation and processes of change within treatment communities 162 
(Bottazzi et al., 2018) as well as comparing outcomes in control and treatment communities (Pynegar et 163 
al., 2018; Wiik et al., 2019).  164 
RCTs are most usefully conducted when the intervention is reasonably well developed 165 
Impact evaluation is a form of summative evaluation, meaning that it involves measuring outcomes of an 166 
established intervention. This can be contrasted with formative evaluation, which progressively develops 167 
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and improves the design of an intervention. Many evaluation theorists recommend a cycle of formative 168 
and summative evaluation, by which interventions may progressively be understood, refined, and 169 
evaluated (Rossi et al., 2004), which is similar to the thinking behind adaptive management (McCarthy & 170 
Possingham, 2007; Gillson et al., 2019). Summative evaluation alone is inflexible as once started, aspects 171 
of the intervention cannot sensibly be changed (at least not without losing external validity). The 172 
substantial investment of time and resources in an RCT is therefore likely to be most appropriate when 173 
implementers are confident that they have an intervention whose functioning is reasonably well 174 
understood (Pattanayak, 2009; Cartwright, 2010). 175 
In Bolivia, Natura has been undertaking incentive-based forest conservation in the Bolivian Andes since 176 
2003. Learning from these experiences was integrated into the design of the Watershared intervention as 177 
evaluated by the RCT which began in 2010. However, despite this substantial experience developing the 178 
intervention, there were challenges with its implementation in the context of the RCT which in retrospect 179 
affected both the program’s effectiveness and the evaluation’s usefulness. For example, uptake of the 180 
agreements was quite low (Wiik et al., 2019), and little of the most important land from a water quality 181 
perspective was enrolled in Watershared agreements. Given this low uptake, the lack of an observed 182 
effect of the program on water quality at landscape scale might have been predicted without the RCT 183 
(Pynegar et al., 2018). Further formative evaluation of uptake rates and likely spatial patterns of 184 
implementation before the RCT was implemented would have been valuable. 185 
What affects the feasibility of RCT evaluation? 186 
Ethical challenges 187 
Randomisation involves withholding the intervention from the control group, so the decision to 188 
randomise is not a morally neutral one. An ethical principle in medical RCTs is that to justify a randomised 189 
experiment, there must be significant uncertainty surrounding whether the treatment is better than the 190 
control (a principle known as equipoise; Brody, 2012). Experiments such as randomly allocating areas to 191 
be deforested or not to investigate ecological impacts would clearly not be ethical, which is why the 192 
Stability of Altered Forest Ecosystems project, for example, made use of already planned deforestation 193 
(Ewers et al., 2011). However the mechanisms through which many conservation interventions, especially 194 
socio-ecological interventions, are intended to result in change are often complex and poorly understood, 195 
meaning that in such RCTs there often will indeed be uncertainty about whether the treatment is better. 196 
Additionally, it is debatable whether obtaining equipoise should even always be an obligation for 197 
evaluators (e.g. Brody 2012), as how well an intervention works, and how cost-effective it is, are also 198 
Commented [JPGJ1]: Just cite once in the sentence-its 
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important results for policymakers (White, 2013b). It may be argued that lack of availability of high-quality 199 
evidence leading to resources being wasted on ineffective interventions is also unethical (List & Rasul, 200 
2011). Decisions such as these are not solely for researchers to make and must be sensitively handled 201 
(White, 2013b).  202 
Another principle of research ethics states that no one should be a participant in an experiment without 203 
giving their free, prior and informed consent. Depending on the scale at which the intervention is 204 
implemented, it may not be possible to obtain consent from every individual in an area. This might be 205 
overcome by randomising by community rather than individual and then giving individuals in the 206 
treatment community the opportunity to opt into the intervention. This shows how implementers can 207 
think flexibly to overcome ethical challenges.  208 
In Bolivia, the complex nature of the socio-ecological system, and the initial relative lack of understanding 209 
of the ways in which the intervention might affect it, meant there was genuine uncertainty about 210 
Watershared’s effectiveness. However, had monitoring shown immediate significant improvements in 211 
water quality in treatment communities, Natura would have stopped the RCT and implemented the 212 
intervention in all communities. Consent was granted by mayors for the randomisation and individual 213 
landowners could choose to sign an agreement or not. While this was both more ethically acceptable and 214 
in reality the only way to implement Watershared agreements in this socio-ecological context, it led to 215 
variable (and sometimes low) uptake of the intervention, complicating the subsequent evaluation (Wiik 216 
et al., 2019). 217 
Spatial and temporal scale  218 
Larger numbers of randomisation units in an RCT allow detection of smaller significant effect sizes (Bloom, 219 
2008). This is easily achievable in small-scale experiments, such as those studying the effects of nest boxes 220 
on bird abundance or of wildflower verges on invertebrate biodiversity; such trials have been a mainstay 221 
of applied ecology for decades. However, increases in scale of the intervention will make RCT 222 
implementation more challenging. Interventions implemented at a large scale will likely have few 223 
randomisation units available for an RCT, increasing the effect size required for a result to be statistically 224 
significant and decreasing the experiment’s power (Bloom, 2008; Glennerster & Takavarasha, 2013). Large 225 
randomisation units are also likely to increase costs and logistical difficulties. However we emphasise that 226 
this does not make such evaluations impossible; two recent RCTs of a purely ecological intervention – 227 
impact of use of neonicotinoid-free seed on bee populations – were conducted across a number of sites 228 
throughout northern and central Europe (Rundlöf et al., 2015; Woodcock et al., 2017). When the number 229 
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of units available is very low, however, RCTs will not be appropriate and theory-based evaluations based 230 
upon analysing expected theories of change may be more sensible (e.g. White & Phillips, 2012). Such 231 
theory-based evaluations allow attribution of changes in outcomes of interest to particular interventions, 232 
but do not allow estimation of treatment effect sizes.  233 
For some conservation interventions, measurable changes in outcomes may take years or even decades, 234 
due to long life cycles of species or the slow and stochastic nature of many ecosystem changes. It is 235 
unlikely to be realistic to set up and monitor RCTs over such timescales. In these cases, RCTs are likely to 236 
be an inappropriate means of impact evaluation, and the best option for evaluators would likely consist 237 
of a quasi-experiment taking advantage of a historically implemented example of the intervention.   238 
In the Bolivian case, an RCT of the Watershared intervention was ambitious but feasible (129 communities 239 
as randomisation units, each consisting of 2 to 185 households). Following baseline data collection in 240 
2010, the intervention was first offered in 2011 and endline data was collected in 2015-16. Effects on 241 
water quality were expected to be observable over this timescale as cattle exclusion can result in 242 
decreases in waterborne bacterial concentration in under 1 year (Meals et al., 2010). However Pynegar et 243 
al. (2018) did not find an impact of the intervention on water quality at landscape scale, and time-lags 244 
may be part of the reason for this. Neither did Wiik et al. (2019) find a strong impact of the program on 245 
deforestation. One hypothesis explaining this is that impacts may take longer to materialise as they can 246 
depend on the development of alternative livelihoods introduced as part of the program. 247 
Available resources 248 
RCTs require substantial human, financial and organisational resources for their design, implementation, 249 
monitoring and evaluation. These resources are above the additional cost of monitoring in control units, 250 
because RCT design, planning, and subsequent analysis and interpretation require substantial effort and 251 
knowledge. USAID advises that a minimum of 3% of a project or program’s budget be allocated to external 252 
evaluation (USAID, 2016), while the World Health Organization recommends 3-5% (WHO, 2013). The UN’s 253 
Evaluation Group has noted that the sums allocated within the UN in the past cannot achieve robust 254 
impact evaluations without major uncounted external contributions (UNEG Impact Evaluation Task Force, 255 
2013). As conservation practitioners are already aware, conducting a high-quality RCT is not cheap (Curzon 256 
& Kontoleon, 2016).  257 
Collaborations between researchers (with independent funding) and practitioners (with a part of their 258 
program budget) can be an effective way for high-quality impact evaluation to be conducted. This was the 259 
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case with the evaluation of Watershared: Natura had funding for implementation of the intervention from 260 
development and conservation organisations, while the additional costs of the RCT came from separate 261 
research grants. Additionally, there are a number of organizations whose goals include conducting and 262 
funding high-quality impact evaluations (including RCTs), such as Innovations for Poverty Action, the Abdul 263 
Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and the International 264 
Initiative for Impact Evaluation (3ie).  265 
What factors affect the quality – the ‘internal validity’ – of an RCT evaluation? 266 
Potential for ‘spillover’, and how selection of randomisation unit may affect this 267 
Evaluators must decide upon the unit at which allocation of the intervention is to occur. In medicine the 268 
unit is normally the individual; in development economics units may be individuals, households, schools, 269 
communities, or other groups, while in conservation units could also potentially include fields, farms, 270 
habitat patches, protected areas, or others. Units selected should correspond to the process of change by 271 
which the intervention is understood to lead to the desired outcome (Glennerster & Takavarasha, 2013).  272 
In conservation RCTs, surrounding context will often be critical to interventions’ functioning. Outcomes 273 
may ‘spill over’ – with changes achieved by the intervention in treatment units affecting outcomes of 274 
interest in control units (Glennerster & Takavarasha, 2013; Baylis et al., 2016) – at least in cases where 275 
the randomisation unit is not ‘closed’ or somehow bounded in a way that prevents this from happening. 276 
For example, an RCT evaluating a successful community-based anti-poaching program would suffer from 277 
spillover if population increases in the treatment community-associated areas resulted in these acting as 278 
a source of individuals for control areas. Spillover thus reduces an intervention’s apparent effect size. If 279 
an intervention were to be implemented in all areas rather than solely treatment areas (presumably the 280 
ultimate goal for practitioners), such spillover would not occur, and so it is a property of the trial itself. 281 
Such spillover affected one of the few large-scale environmental management RCTs: that evaluating 282 
badger culling in south-western England (Donnelly et al., 2005).  283 
Spillover is particularly likely to occur if the randomisation unit and the natural unit of the intended 284 
ecological process of change are incongruent, meaning the intervention would inevitably be implemented 285 
in areas which would affect outcomes in control units. Therefore, consideration of spatial relationships 286 
between units, and of the relationship between randomisation units and the outcomes’ process of 287 
change, is critical. For example the anti-poaching program described above might instead use closed 288 
groups or populations of the target species as the randomisation unit, with the program then 289 
implemented in communities covering the range of each treatment group. Spillover may also be reduced 290 
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by selecting indicators and/or sites to monitor which would still be relevant but would be unlikely to suffer 291 
from it (i.e. more bounded units or monitoring sites – such as by choosing a species to monitor with a 292 
small range size, or ensuring that a control area’s monitoring site would not be directly downstream of a 293 
treatment area’s in an RCT of a payments for watershed services program).  294 
In the RCT of Watershared, it proved difficult to select a randomisation unit that was politically feasible 295 
and worked for all outcomes of interest. Natura used community as the randomisation unit, so community 296 
boundaries had to be defined and these did not always align well with the watersheds supplying the 297 
communities’ water sources. While very few water quality monitoring sites were directly downstream of 298 
another, land under agreements in one community would sometimes be located in the watershed 299 
upstream of the monitoring site of another, risking spillover. The extent to which this took place, and its 300 
consequences, were studied empirically(Pynegar, 2018) However, the randomisation unit worked well for 301 
the deforestation analysis. Communities have easily defined boundaries (although see Wiik et al., 2019) 302 
and offering the program by community was most practical logistically. A smaller unit would have 303 
presented issues of perceived fairness as it would have been extremely difficult to have offered 304 
Watershared agreements to some members of communities and not to others. Jayachandran et al. 305 
(2017)’s RCT also selected community as the randomisation unit.  306 
Consequences of human behavioural effects on evaluation of socio-ecological interventions 307 
There is a key difference between ecological interventions that aim to have a direct impact on an 308 
ecosystem, and socio-ecological interventions which seek to deliver ecosystem changes by changing 309 
human behaviour. Medical RCTs are generally double-blinded so neither the researcher nor the 310 
participants know who has been assigned to the treatment or control group. Double-blinding is possible 311 
for some ecological interventions such as pesticide impacts on non-target invertebrate diversity in an 312 
agroecosystem: implementers do not have to know whether they are applying the pesticide or a control 313 
(see Rundlöf et al., 2015). However, it is harder to carry out double-blind trials of socio-ecological 314 
interventions, as the intervention’s consequences can be observed by the evaluators (even if they are not 315 
the people actually implementing it) and participants will obviously know whether they are being offered 316 
the intervention. 317 
Lack of blinding creates potential problems. Participants in control communities may observe activities in 318 
nearby treatment communities and implement aspects of them on their own, reducing the measured 319 
impact of the intervention. Alternatively, they may feel resentful at being excluded from a beneficial 320 
intervention and therefore reduce existing pro-conservation behaviours (Alpízar et al., 2017). It may be 321 
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possible to reduce or eliminate such phenomena through selecting units whose individuals infrequently 322 
interact with each other. Evaluators of Watershared believed that members of control communities might 323 
decide to protect watercourses themselves after seeing successful results elsewhere (which would be 324 
encouraging for the NGO, suggesting local support for the intervention, but which would interfere with 325 
the evaluation by reducing the estimated intervention effect size). They therefore included questions in 326 
endline socio-economic surveys to identify this effect; these revealed only one case in over 1500 327 
household surveys (Pynegar, 2018). 328 
The second issue with lack of blinding is that randomisation is intended to achieve that treatment and 329 
control groups are not systematically different immediately after randomisation. However those allocated 330 
to control or treatment may have different expectations or show different behaviour or effort simply as a 331 
consequence of the awareness of being allocated to a control or treatment group (Chassang et al., 2012). 332 
Hence the outcome observed may not depend solely on the efficacy of the intervention; some authors 333 
have claimed that these effects may be large (Bulte et al., 2014).  334 
Overlapping terms have been introduced into the literature to describe the ways in which actions of 335 
participants in experiments vary due to differences in effort between treatment and control groups 336 
(summarised in table 1). We do not believe that behavioural effects inevitably invalidate RCT evaluation 337 
as some have claimed (Scriven, 2008), as part of any intervention’s impact when implemented will be due 338 
to implementers’ expended effort (Chassang et al., 2012). It also remains unclear whether behavioural 339 
effects are large enough to result in incorrect inference (Bulte et al., 2014; Bausell, 2015). In the case of 340 
the evaluation of Watershared, compliance monitoring is an integral part of incentive-based or 341 
conditional conservation, so any behavioural effect driven by increased monitoring should be thought of 342 
as an effect of the intervention rather than a confounding influence. Such effects may also be reduced 343 
through low-impact monitoring (Glennerster & Takavarasha, 2013). Water quality measurement was 344 
unobtrusive (few community members were aware of Natura technicians being present) and infrequent 345 
(either annual or biennial); deforestation monitoring was even less obtrusive as it was based upon satellite 346 
imagery; and socio-economic surveys were undertaken equally in treatment and control communities. 347 
Conclusions 348 
Scientific evidence supporting an intervention’s use does not necessarily lead to the uptake of that 349 
intervention. Policy is at best evidence-informed rather than evidence-based (Adams & Sandbrook, 2013; 350 
Rose et al., 2018) because cost and political acceptability inevitably influence decisions, and frameworks 351 
to integrate evidence into decision-making are often lacking (Segan et al., 2011). However, improving 352 
13 
 
available knowledge of intervention effectiveness is still important. For example, conservation managers 353 
are more likely to report an intention to change their management strategies when presented with high-354 
quality evidence (Walsh et al., 2015). Conservation science therefore needs to use the best possible 355 
approaches for evaluation of interventions. 356 
Like any evaluation method, Randomised Control Trials are clearly not suitable in all circumstances. Large-357 
scale RCTs are unlikely to be a worthwhile approach to impact evaluation unless the intervention to be 358 
evaluated is well understood, either from theory or previous formative evaluation. Even when feasible 359 
and potentially useful, RCTs must be designed with great care to avoid spillover and behavioural effects. 360 
There also will inevitably remain some level of subjectivity whether a location or context for subsequent 361 
implementation of an intervention is similar enough to one where an RCT was carried out to allow learning 362 
to be confidently applied. However RCTs can be used to establish a reliable and intuitively plausible 363 
counterfactual and therefore provide a robust estimate of intervention effectiveness, and hence cost-364 
effectiveness. It is therefore unsurprising that interest in their use is increasing within the conservation 365 
community. We hope that those interested in evaluating the impact of conservation interventions can 366 
learn from the use of RCTs in other fields while avoiding the polarisation and controversy surrounding 367 
them. Over time RCTs may then make a substantial contribution towards conservation impact evaluation. 368 
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Tables  546 
Table 1. Consequences of behavioural effects when compared with results obtained in a hypothetical double-blind RCT. Hawthorne ‘1’, ‘2’ and ‘3’ 547 
refer to the three kinds of Hawthorne effect discussed in Levitt & List (2011).  548 
Effect name Description/Explanation Effect on outcome 
in treatment group 
Effect on outcome 
in control group 
Effect on estimated effect 
size of intervention 
‘Hawthorne 1’ Evaluators being seen to observe participants 
causes participants to increase effort. 
Increases Increases Unknown 
‘Hawthorne 2’ Modifications made to the intervention itself 
during the course of the experiment cause 
participants to increase effort. 
None / Increases None None / Increases 
‘Hawthorne 3’ Experimental participants tend to meet what they 
believe to be experimenters’ expectations. This 
may derive from increased effort in treatment 
units (the Pygmalion effect; Rosenthal & Jacobson, 
1968) and/or decreased effort in control units (the 
golem effect; Babad et al., 1982). Treatment-
group interviewees also tend to give answers they 
believe evaluators wish to hear (experimenter 
demand; Levitt & List, 2011). 
Increases None / Decreases Increases 
Rational effort Experimental participants decide how much effort 
to expend on implementing an intervention based 
upon their own expectations of the intervention’s 
effectiveness; this closely parallels the Galatea 
effect (Babad et al., 1982). 
Increases None / Decreases Increases 
‘John Henry’ Individuals in the control group increase effort in 
an attempt to compete with the intervention 
group (Saretsky, 1972; see also Bausell, 2015). 
None None / Increases None / Decreases 
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Figures 549 
 550 
Figure 1. Summary of suggested decision-making process for evaluators to decide if an RCT evaluation of 551 
their conservation intervention would useful, feasible, and of high quality.  552 
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 553 
Figure 2. a) Locations of the 65 treatment and 64 control communities included in the RCT evaluating the 554 
impact of the Watershared incentive-based conservation intervention by Fundación Natura Bolivia 555 
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(‘Natura’) in the Bolivian Andes. b) Location of the RCT (the ANMI Río Grande – Valles Cruceños protected 556 
area) within Bolivia. 557 
